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Sponsored by Rep. Andrew Ogles (R-TN) · 4 active : 4 Republicans
Latest action: Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
Strengthening Cyber Resilience Against State-Sponsored Threats Act
The bill creates a joint interagency task force to facilitate agency collaboration on efforts to respond to Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors, including Volt Typhoon.
The task force must be established and led by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), an agency within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The task force must facilitate collaboration and coordination among the Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs) specified in the President's National Security Memorandum- 22 (e.g., the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Agriculture) to detect, analyze, and respond to Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors by ensuring that such agencies’ actions are aligned and mutually reinforcing.
The bill directs DHS, CISA, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and specified SRMAs to provide the task force with analysis, inspections, audits, and other relevant information necessary for the task force to carry out its responsibilities. The production and use of information must comply with all applicable statutes, regulations, and executive orders, and task force members must have appropriate security clearances to access classified information.
The task force must provide annual reports and briefings to Congress detailing its assessment of cyber threats and recommendations to improve the detection and mitigation of the cybersecurity threat posed by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors.
The first report must be provided no later than 540 days after the establishment of the task force, and additional reports must be provided annually thereafter for six years.
Each member’s recorded vote compared with their swing projection from before the vote. A member by voting against most of their own party.
| BandBand before the vote | VotedVoted yea or nay | BrokeBroke with party | Share |
|---|---|---|---|
| Swing | 47 | 0 | 0% |
| Middle | 176 | 5 | 3% |
| Entrenched | 115 | 2 | 2% |
Members fall into . 6 representatives don’t have enough data yet and are marked “insufficient data”. Non-voting delegates are not counted. The bill is not before the House right now; these scores show where members would stand.
: only movement toward the other party counts, so members who sit further from the center than their party no longer score as swing votes.
Bars show each input from 0 to 100: ideology gap, scorecard gap, , and the . is the seat’s partisan lean, and shows how much of the input data a score has.
Loading similar votes
| Insufficient data |
|---|
| 66 |
| 1 |
| 2% |
| All voting members | 404 | 8 | 2% |
|---|
: Pair any member who broke with one who stayed with their party: in 46% of those pairs, the one who broke had the higher swing score before the vote. Chance would be 50%.
Projections from swing-v3-dir, computed with data from before the vote. Present and not voting never count as breaking.

These members have less than half of the model’s inputs, so their scores are not banded or ranked.






Ringed dots broke with their party on the vote.
Ideology is each member’s score. The cluster low on the chart includes the bill’s 4 sponsor and cosponsors in the House: they have already committed, so they score as entrenched. 6 representatives without a DW-NOMINATE score or with insufficient data are not plotted.
Similar votes count toward swing-v3 in the House: total similarity weight 6.0 (needs 5.0).